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BUFFALO LAIV REVIEW
appellate court, to take them into consideration. Thus, a defendant, by the device
of a preliminary motion to inspect, could require the trial court to determine the
sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury without the necessary independent
showing of insufficiency.
Sufficiency of Indicfment Based upon Coerced Confession
The grand jury is required to iind an indictment when all the evidence
before it would, if unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the
trial jury. 8 In People v. Caminito,8'9 the evidence presented to the grand jury
consisted of confessions by the defendant and proof of the corpus delicti. After
conviction and unsuccessful appeals the defendant sought redress in the federal
courts by way of habeas corpus. The United States Court of Appeals sustained
the writ on the ground that the defendant's confessions had been coerced and
remanded the case to the county court for further proceedings.90 The defendant
then moved to set aside the indictment on the ground that it was based on
insufficient evidence.
The question before the Court was whether the indictment could stand after
the confessions upon which it was based were found by a federal court to have been
coerced. Relying up People v. Donahue9l the Court held that any taint a
defendant may be able to show with respect to evidence adduced, not apparent
in the grand jury minutes, must be offered at the trial for the appraisal and
decision of the trial jury. The evidence which was before the grand jury, if
unexplained or uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction. Therefore, the Court
reasoned, the indictment must stand.
The Court refused to consider developments subsequent to the grand jury's
presentment of the indictment, but considered the evidence only in the light of
what had been then known to the grand jury. This approach appears rather rigid
since the evidence having been conclusively held to be inadmissible,' 2 could no
longer warrant a conviction if unexplained or uncontradicted. The Donahue case
can be easily distinguished. The objection to the indictment in that case was a
contention that the defendant had no criminal intent. In the present case the
objection was not a mere contention by the defendant but a conclusive holding
of a federal court rendering the confession inadmissible as evidence. The purpose
of the rule in the Donahue case was to leave questions arising from conflicting
evidence to be determined at the trial. But here the federal court's holding barred
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the possibility that any such question might arise. The Court, however, has shown
a general reluctance to dismiss indictments."
Effect of Omission of Essential Element of Burglary First Degree from Long
Form Indictment - Per Curiam
A long form indictment for first degree burglary was insufficient since it
did not allege that the crime occurred at night 94 and could not be amended nor
the deficiency provided by a bill of particulars.95 However, the indictment did not
have to be dismissed since it spelled out essential requirements of fact for burglary
second degree and the misnomer was not fatal error. 96
Unlawful Advertising
Defendant was convicted of violation of section 421 of the Penal Law which
makes it a misdemeanor to put before the public with intent to sell merchandise
an advertisement containing any assertion which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading.
The allegedly misleading advertising consisted of three signs reading "Toys 20%
to 40% off. Come in and Browse around," "Largest Selection of standard brand
toys, 20% to 40% off," and "Toy Discount, Westchester First Supermarket.
20% to 40%."
Defendant's appeal from affirmance of conviction by the County Court was
based mainly upon three contentions: (1) that it was error to admit evidence to.
prove a standard price for such toys and games; (2) that while the signs
referred to toys the evidence concerned tl;e prices of games and not toys; (3
that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the meaning of
the signs was that all, rather than a substantial number of the toys, could be
purchased at tle discount and that evidence which indicated only that three
games were sold at or above the standard retail price thus failed to establish guilt.
The Court of Appeals by a 4-3 majority found the conviction to be "not
completely unsupportable" and affirmed the courts below. 97 As to defendant's
first contention, the Court held that although defendant was entitled to place its
own price upon the toys and then discount that price as it wished, it would not be
allowed to give the impression that it was giving 20% to 40% off the ordinary,
established, or prevailing price in the community. The existence of such a prevailing price was found properly proven by expert testimony.
See People v. Howell, 3 N.Y.2d 672, 171 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1958).
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